Abstract. Public key cryptography has been invented to overcome some key management problems in open networks. Although nearly all aspects of public key cryptography rely on the existence of trapdoor one-way functions, only a very few candidates of this primitive have been observed yet. In this paper, we introduce a new trapdoor one-way permutation based on the hardness of factoring integers of p 2 q-type. We also propose a variant of this function with a different domain that provides some advantages for practical applications. To confirm this statement, we develop a simple hybrid encryption scheme based on our proposed trapdoor permutation that is CCA-secure in the random oracle model.
Introduction
Informally, a one-way permutation is a bijective function that is "easy" to compute but "hard" to invert. If there is some token of information that makes the inversion also an easy task, then we call the function trapdoor. Trapdoor oneway permutations are used as building blocks for various kind of cryptographic schemes, e.g. asymmetric encryption, digital signatures, and private information retrieval. There is no doubt that the concept of trapdoor one-way permutations is of particular importance especailly in public key cryptography. Nevertheless, just a relatively small number of promising candidates can be found in the literature. Promising means that the one-wayness of the trapdoor permutation can be reduced to a presumed hard problem such as the integer factorization problem. As not even the pure existence of one-way functions can be proven today 1 , this kind of provable secure trapdoor permutations is the best alternative solution at present.
Previous Work
The oldest and still best known candidate trapdoor permutation is the RSA function, i.e. modular exponentiation with exponents coprime to the order of the multiplicative residue group [RSA78] . The factors of the modulus can serve as a trapdoor to invert the RSA function, but the opposite direction is unknown. Thus RSA is not provably equivalent to factoring, and there are serious doubts that this equivalence holds indeed [BV98] . Anyway, as the RSA problem has been extensively studied for decades, nowadays inverting the RSA function is widely accepted as a hard problem itself. Slightly later, M. O. Rabin observed that the special case of modular squaring can be reduced to factoring [Rab79] . Modular squaring, however, is not a permutation, it is 4-to-1 (if a two-factor modulus is used). This can be overcome: squaring modulo a Blum integer 2 n is a permutation of the quadratic residues modulo n. The resulting trapdoor permutation is referred to as Blum-Williams function in the literature, and an extension (exponent 2e, where e is coprime to λ(n)) is denoted Rabin-Williams function. More factorization-based trapdoor permutations were proposed by Kurosawa et al [KIT88] , Paillier [Pai99a, Pai99b] , and Galindo et al [GMMV03] . A survey on trapdoor permutations including some less established candidates can be found in [PG97] .
Our Contribution
In this paper, we introduce a rather simple trapdoor one-way permutation equivalent to factoring integers of the shape n = p 2 q. As many previous candidates, our proposed trapdoor function is also a variant of the RSA function, namely in our case the public exponent is the same as the modulus n = p 2 q. With the domain Z × n the function x → x n mod n is p-to-one, but restricted to the subgroup of n-th residues modulo n, it is indeed a permutation. This property is similar to the Blum-Williams function (where n-th residues are replaced by quadratic residues). Analogical to the quadratic residuosity assumption, we assume that without knowledge of the factorization of n, it is hard to distinguish n-th residues from non-residues, whereas it is efficient if the factors of n are known. However, the restricted domain has some shortcomings that also apply to Blum-Williams and Rabin-Williams functions: in practical applications, the data has to be preprocessed into the set of n-th resp. quadratic residues. Supposably this is one reason why the RSA function (with domain Z n ) is by far more widespread in commercial applications than Rabin-type functions. But fortunately, we can prove that for n of p 2 q-type the set of n-th residues is isomorphic to Z × pq , thus our proposed trapdoor function is also a bijection between the easy-to-handle domain Z × pq and the set of n-th residues. No such property is known for Rabin-type functions. Indeed, we can show that our proposed trapdoor permutation easily provides practical applications by constructing a hybrid encryption scheme based on Abe et al's Tag-KEM/DEM framework that is chosen-ciphertext (CCA) secure in the random oracle model.
A Trapdoor One-way Permutation Equivalent to Factoring
In this section, we introduce a new trapdoor one-way permutation. We also give a short account on its mathematical background in order to deepen the understanding about the special properties of the group Z × n for n of p 2 q-type.
Notations and definitions
Let n be a positive integer. We write Z n for the ring of residue classes modulo n, and Z × n for its multiplicative group, i.e. the set of invertible elements modulo n. For x ∈ Z × n , ord n (x) denotes the multiplicative order of x modulo n, i.e. the smallest positive integer k with x k = 1 mod n. Furthermore, ϕ : N → N means Euler's totient function.
For any homomorphism h, we denote the kernel and the image with ker(h) and im(h), respectively. As usual, a probability Pr(k) is called negligible if Pr(k) decreases faster than the reciprocal of any polynomial in k, i.e. ∀c∃k c (k > k c ⇒ Pr(k) < k −c ). Unless indicated otherwise, all algorithms are randomized, but we don't mention the random coins as an extra input. If A is a probabilistic algorithm, then A(y 1 , . . . , y n ) refers to the probability space which to the string x assigns the probability that A on input y 1 , . . . , y n outputs x. For any probability space S, the phrase x ← S denotes that x is selected at random according to S. In particular, if S is a finite set, then x ← S is the operation of picking x uniformly at random from S. Finally, we write |n| 2 for the bit-length of the integer n. For the sake of completeness, we formally define the notion of trapdoor one-way permutation.
Definition 1 (Collection of trapdoor one-way permutations). Let I be a set of indices such that for each i ∈ I the sets D i and Let F = {f i |f i : D i → D i } i∈I be a family of permutations. Then F is said to be a collection of trapdoor one-way permutations if 1. There exists a polynomial p and a probabilistic polynomial time key generator KeyGen such that KeyGen on input 1 k (the security parameter) outputs a pair
The data t i is denoted the trapdoor information of f i . 2. The domains D i are samplable: There exists a probabilistic polynomial time sampling algorithm S that on input i ∈ I outputs x ∈ D i uniformly chosen at random. 3. The members of F are easy to evaluate: There exists a deterministic polynomial time evaluator Eval that on input i ∈ I, x ∈ D i outputs f i (x). 4. Inverting the members of F is easy if the trapdoor information is known:
There exists a deterministic polynomial time inverter Inv such that for all x ∈ D i we have Inv(t i , f i (x)) = x.
5. Inverting the members of F is hard if the trapdoor information is unknown: For every probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A I the following probability is negligible in k:
Note that in contrast to strictly mathematical parlance we do not require that permutations are maps onto itself.
Our proposed trapdoor one-way permutation
Throughout this section, let p, q be primes with p q − 1 and q p − 1 and define n = p 2 q. All of our constructions are based on the following group homomorphism:
Definition 2 (The homomorphism h). Let p, q be primes with p q − 1, q p − 1 and n = p 2 q. Then we define:
The reason why we don't use standard RSA moduli is the observation that in Z × n with n = p 2 q there are members of order p:
Lemma 1. Let p, q be primes with p q − 1 and n = p 2 q. Define the set S as
Then S consists of exactly the elements of multiplicative order p in Z × n .
Proof. Let x be an element of multiplicative order p in Z × n . Then we have
Hence pq|x − 1 must hold, and we conclude x ∈ S. On the other hand, from the binomial expansion formula it is obvious that for all x ∈ S we have x p = 1 mod n ∧ x = 1, thus the assertion follows.
From Lemma 1 we can easily deduce that each element of order p in Z × n reveals the factorization of n. On this fact we will base the one-wayness of our proposed trapdoor permutations. Next, we analyze the relationship between the homomorphism h and the set S:
Lemma 2. Let h and S be defined as above. Then we have
Proof. Note that as p is the only non-trivial common factor of n and ϕ(n) = p(p − 1)(q − 1), we must have
Hence the kernel of h consists of 1 and exactly the elements of multiplicative order p in Z × n , i.e the elements of S as defined in Lemma 1.
As the magnitude of the kernel of h is exactly p, we obtain Corollary 1. The homomorphism h as defined above is p-to-1.
Now we will prove that h is collision-resistant, because a collision leads to a non-trivial element of ker(h).
x n = y n mod n leads to xy −1 ∈ ker(h), consequently xy −1 = 1 mod pq using Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
Thus we have
Corollary 2. If factoring integers of the shape p 2 q is hard, then the homomorphism h is collision-resistant.
Proof. Assume that A is a polynomial time algorithm that on input n determines x, y ∈ Z × n with x = y and h(x) = h(y). From Theorem 1 we conclude gcd(x − y, n) = pq, which completely reveals the factorization of n.
Next, we formally define the set of n-th residues modulo n.
n } = im(h) denote the set of the n-th residues modulo n.
N-R(n) is a subgroup of Z × n of order (p − 1)(q − 1) (as there are exactly ϕ(pq) = (p − 1)(q − 1) pairwise different n-th residues modulo n, namely the elements {x n mod n|x ∈ Z × pq }). Now we can state the main results of this section:
N-R } n∈I is a collection of trapdoor one-way permutations, where f
x → x n mod n.
2. Let I be defined as above. The family F pq = {f
pq } n∈I is a collection of trapdoor one-way permutations, where f (n) pq is defined as
In both cases, the trapdoor is the factorization of n and the one-wayness is based on the factorization assumption. For individual members, we omit the superscript (n) whenever it is clear from the context.
Proof. 1. We first show that the f N-R are indeed permutations. Define d = n −1 mod ϕ(pq) (note that gcd(n, ϕ(pq)) = 1). Let x be an element of N-R(n), i.e. x = y n mod n for an appropriate y ∈ Z × n . Then we have (
x mod n, because of n 2 d = n mod ϕ(n) (equality holds modulo p and modulo ϕ(pq)). Thus, x → x n mod n is a permutation of N-R(n). Properties 1. to 3. of Definition 1 are obviously fulfilled. It is clear that d (resp. the factorization of n) can be used as a trapdoor to invert f N-R . The one-wayness (property 5.) is a consequence of Corollary 2: To factor n with access to an oracle that inverts f N-R , we choose an element x ∈ Z × n at random and query the oracle on h(x) = x n mod n. With probability 1 − 1/p we have x ∈ N-R(n) and the oracle will answer x ∈ N-R(n) with x = x mod n such that x and x collide under h. Hence gcd(x − x , n) = pq reveals the factorization of n. 2. Define d as above. Then it is easy to see that (f pq (x)) d = x mod pq holds for all x ∈ Z pq . Thus f pq is a bijection. The remaining properties can be shown along the lines of the proof given above.
Remark 1. The fact that modular exponentiation with n = p 2 q can be inverted uniquely modulo pq has been implicitely exploited in [Pai99b] , where P. Paillier introduced a trapdoor permutation based on the Okamoto-Uchiyama trapdoor mechanism. However, the results and the proof techiques used in [Pai99b] are substantial different from our proposal.
We want to point out the similarities among exponentiation modulo n = p 2 q and Rabin-type modular squaring. In both cases, we have a group homomorphism with a non-trivial kernel. Moreover, one-wayness holds because each non-trivial kernel element reveals the factorization of the modulus. Obviously, the RabinWilliams permutation on quadratic residues corresponds to our permutation f N-R on n-th residues. In the case of modular squaring, however, there is no analogue to the bijection f pq . The latter is interesting for practical applications, as no preprocessing into the set of n-th residues is necessary. In particular, f pq can be used to encrypt arbitrary strings like keys. We provide an application in Section 3. Further advantages of our proposal are due to the fact that the magnitude of the kernel is larger. For instance, it is possible to construct fail-stop signature schemes [SS04] and trapdoor commitments [SST05] from the homomorphism h. To emphasize the analogy to modular squaring even more, we assume that without knowledge of the factors of n distinguishing N-R(n) from Z × n is hard 3 (cf. the well-known quadratic residuosity assumption). Given p and q, however, deciding n-th residuosity is efficient.
Proof. See Appendix A.
3 An Exemplary Application: Chosen-ciphertext Secure Hybrid Encryption
Although the concept of public key cryptography (aka asymmetric cryptography) is pretty appealing and has many organizational advantages, secret key cryptography (aka symmetric cryptography) is still much more efficient. Thus for practical applications the combination of both concepts, i.e. hybrid encryption is quite popular.
In this section, we will prove that our proposed trapdoor function is not only of theoretical interest by constructing a simple chosen-ciphertext secure hybrid encryption scheme as an exemplary application. In particular, we show that our novel scheme offers notable advantages compared to the members of the wellknown EPOC family [FKM + ,OP00]. We choose these schemes as a candidate because they all rely on the Okamoto-Uchiyama trapdoor mechanism that like ours is based on the hardness of factoring integers n = p 2 q [OU98] . However, as EPOC-1 has a worse security reduction than EPOC-2 and a similar performance, we focus on EPOC-2 and EPOC-3.
The Okamoto-Uchiyama trapdoor mechanism and EPOC-2/3
For the sake of self-containedness of this paper, we briefly sketch the OkamotoUchiyama trapdoor mechanism (see [OU98] for details). Let n be of the shape n = p 2 q for two large primes p, q. Consider the Sylow group Γ p = {x ∈ Z p 2 |x = 1 mod p} of Z × p 2 . The crucial observation is that the L-function defined on Γ p as For fixed h ∈ N-R(n) and g ∈ Z × n with p| ord p 2 (g) the Okamoto-Uchiyama encryption of m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , p − 1} is as follows: choose randomness r ∈ Z n and compute c = g m h r mod n. If p is known, then m can be recovered from c in the following way:
The correctness is deduced from the additive homomorphic properties of the L-function because we have c = g m p mod p 2 and g p ∈ Γ p . In [OU98] it is shown that breaking the one-wayness of this scheme is as hard as factoring the modulus.
EPOC-3 is obtained by applying the REACT-conversion [OP01] to the OkamotoUchiyama encryption scheme. The REACT-conversion builds an CCA-secure (in the random oracle model) hybrid encryption scheme from any one-way-PCA secure asymmetric encryption scheme combined with a symmetric cryptosystem semantically secure against passive attacks. Here, PCA denotes plaintext-checking attack. In this model, the adversary has access to an oracle that on input a message m and a ciphertext c answers if c is a possible encryption of m. Of course, this oracle is only helpful if the encryption is probabilistic, otherwise the adversary can answer the queries himself. Thus, in the deterministic scenario, one-wayness-PCA is equivalent to one-wayness under the weakest attack, i.e. chosen-plaintext-attack (CPA). The benefit of REACT is that the security reduction is tight and that the decryption process is very fast, as only the computation of a single hash-value is necessary to check if the ciphertext is well-formed. In previous conversion techniques, a costly re-encryption was necessary to fulfill this purpose. In the case of EPOC-3, note that although the one-wayness of the Okamoto-Uchiyama encryption is equivalent to factoring integers p 2 q, the security of the converted scheme is only based on the probably stronger GapHigh-Residuosity assumption. This is due to the fact that Okamoto-Uchiyama is probabilistic and thus one-way-PCA is not equivalent to one-way-CPA 4 .
EPOC-2 is the outcome of combining the Okamoto-Uchiyama encryption and a semantically secure (against passive adversaries) symmetric encryption scheme using the Fujisaki-Okamoto conversion technique [FO99] . In contrast to EPOC-3, EPOC-2 is CCA secure under the p 2 q-factoring assumption in the ROM. Although in general the security reduction of the Fujisaki-Okamoto conversion technique is not very tight, Fujisaki observed a tight reduction proof tailored to the special application EPOC-2 [Fuj01] . A disadvantage of EPOC-2 is that in the decryption phase a re-encryption is necessary as an integrity check. For efficiency reasons, this re-encryption is only performed modulo q instead modulo n (accepting a small error probability). Nevertheless, the decryption is less efficient than in case of EPOC-3. There is also a second drawback due to the re-encryption: poor implementation makes EPOC-2 vulnerable against rejecttiming attacks [ST03, Den02] . In this attack, the adversary can find the secret key if he is able to distinguish the two different kinds of rejections of invalid ciphertexts (if the enciphered text does not meet length restrictions on the one hand, or if the re-encryption test fails on the other hand). As the re-encryption involves the costly public key operations and hence takes a suitable amount of time, careless implementation makes it possible for an adversary to distinguish between the two cases by measuring the time of rejection. 4 One could ask why the randomization is not removed before applying REACT (this would lead to the enciphering c = g m mod n, and the same decryption as in the original scheme). But note that in this case, we cannot reduce one-wayness to factoring as before, because the distributions of {g m mod n|m > p} and {g m mod n|m < p} are not necessarily the same.
The Tag-KEM/DEM framework for hybrid encryption
Beside the technique of applying specific generic constructions to suitable asymmetric and symmetric primitives, a more general solution of hybrid encryption has been introduced by Cramer and Shoup in [CS04] . In this paper, Cramer and Shoup formalize the so-called KEM/DEM framework where KEM is a probabilistic asymmetric key-encapsulation mechanism, and DEM is a symmetric encryption scheme (a data encapsulation mechanism) used to encrypt messages of arbitrary length with the key given by the KEM. Needless to say, such combinations of public and secret key schemes have been folklore for years, but Cramer and Shoup for the first time gave a rigorously analyzed formal treatment of this subject. Note that a KEM is not the same as a key agreement protocol: the encapsulated key is designated to be used once only, therefore the DEM is only required to be secure in the one-time scenario. For more details on security definitions and requirements the reader is referred to [CS04] . Roughly speaking, if both the KEM and the DEM part are CCA-secure, then the same holds for the whole KEM/DEM scheme.
At this year's Eurocrypt, Abe et al enhanced Cramer and Shoup's framework by introducing the notion of a Tag-KEM, which is a KEM equipped with a special piece of information, the tag [AGK05] . In their novel framework for hybrid encryption, this tag as part of an CCA-secure Tag-KEM is assigned to protect the non-malleability of the DEM part. Consequently, for the CCA-security of the whole Tag-KEM/DEM hybrid scheme with an CCA-secure Tag-KEM, it is only required that the DEM part is secure against passive adversaries. This is an obvious improvement compared to the KEM/DEM framework, but the flip-side of the coin is that proving a Tag-KEM to be CCA-secure is somewhat more involved than the analogue proof for a "plain" KEM. In [AGK05, AGKS05] , the authors provide some generic constructions for Tag-KEMs built from combinations of primitives like KEM, MAC, hash-functions and public key encryption.
In the following, we construct a new Tag-KEM based on our proposed trapdoor permutation and prove its CCA-security in the ROM. Then we show how this leads to a CCA-secure hybrid encryption scheme in the Tag-KEM/DEM framework. Finally, we compare this novel scheme with EPOC-2/3.
The proposed Tag-KEM
In [AGK05, AGKS05] , the notion of Tag-KEM is formally defined. Here -to prevent redundancy -we only give the concrete description of our proposed Tag-KEM that, in our opinion, should be self-explanatory.
TKEM.Gen(1 k ): Let k be a security parameter. Choose two distinct k bit primes p, q with p q − 1, q p − 1 such that each of p − 1, q − 1 has a large prime factor 5 . Build the product n = p 2 q, compute d = n −1 mod ϕ(pq) and define rLen = 2k − 2. Select a key derivation function KDF that maps bitstrings into the key-space of the designated DEM and a hash-function H, which outputs bit-strings of length hashLen. Return a pair (pk, sk) of public and secret key, where pk = (n, rLen, KDF, H) and sk = (d, p, q). TKEM.Key(pk): Choose ω ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2 rLen − 1} uniformly at random, compute dk = KDF(ω) and return (ω, dk). TKEM.Enc(ω, τ ): Given the key carrier ω and a tag τ , compute c 1 = ω n mod n, c 2 = H(ω, τ ) and return Ψ = (c 1 , c 2 ) . In the first step, a key pair is generated. Then a one-time key dk for the DEM part is constructed by applying a key derivation function to a random bit string. Note that the role of KDF is not only to format the bit string according to the key space of the designated DEM, but also KDF is required to destroy all algebraic relations between its input and the encapsulated key. In the security proof, both of KDF and H are modeled as random oracles [BR93] . In the step TKEM.Enc, the one-time key (which in some sense is embedded in ω) is encrypted together with the tag τ . Finally, using TKEM.Dec sk the one-time key dk can be recovered from the encapsulation Ψ and the tag τ .
Remark 2. In the decapsulation procedure, it is necessary to check if r indeed meets the length requirements (|r| 2 ≤ rLen = 2k − 2), because otherwise a simple chosen-ciphertext attack can be mounted to obtain the secret factor pq by binary search [JQY01] .
CCA-security of a Tag-KEM requires that an adversary with adaptive oracle access to TKEM.Dec sk has no chance to distinguish whether a given one-time key dk is encapsulated in a challenge (Ψ, τ ) or not, even if the tag τ is chosen by the adversary himself. As usual, this is defined via an appropriate game. The following definition is almost verbatim from [AGKS05]:
Definition 4 (Security of Tag-KEM). Let K D be the key space of an appropriate DEM, O be the decapsulation oracle TKEM.Dec sk (., .) and let A T be an adversary against Tag-KEM playing the following game: GAME.TKEM:
Step 6. the adversary is restricted not to query the decapsulation oracle on the challenge Ψ, τ , but queries Ψ,τ for τ =τ are permitted. The values ν 1 , ν 2 are internal state informations. We define the advantage of the adversary A T
2 and as max A T ( A T ), where the maximum is taken over all adversaries modeled as polynomial time Turing machines. Tag-KEM is said to be CCA-secure, if is negligible in the security parameter k.
In Appendix B, we prove the following theorem:
Theorem 4. If factoring integers of the shape n = p 2 q is hard, then the Tag-KEM defined above is CCA-secure in the random oracle model.
More formally: If there exists an adversary A T attacking the proposed Tag-KEM in the random oracle model as in Definition 4 -in time t, -with advantage , -querying the random oracle representing the key derivation function at most q K times, -querying the random oracle representing the hash function at most q H times, -invoking the decapsulation oracle at most q D times, then there exists an adversary A F act who factors n = p 2 q in time t and with advantage , where
where t gcd is the time needed to perform a gcd computation with inputs O(n) and t fpq is the time needed to evaluate f pq .
The proposed hybrid encryption scheme
As before, to avoid lengthy recurrences, we do not review the generic Tag-KEM/DEM framework, but we only describe the concrete hybrid encryption scheme that is obtained when combining our proposed Tag-KEM with an appropriate DEM. The interested reader is referred to [AGKS05, AGK05] mLen . Key Generation: The key generation is the same as in TKEM.Gen(.). Encryption and decryption is performed as follows: In the above theorem, CCA-security of hybrid encryption is defined in the standard sense, i.e. indistinguishability of ciphertexts under adaptive chosenciphertext attacks. Note that the reduction to factoring is tight.
Remark 3. Interestingly, the proposed hybrid encryption scheme is very similar to the scheme obtained from applying the REACT-conversion to f pq [OP01] . The only difference in the REACT-case is that the inputs of the hash function H would be m, ω and c 1 . This is a small disadvantage because it decreases the efficiency and it is necessary to recover m before the second integrity check can be performed. As noted above, reject-timing attacks like [ST03, Den02] are possible if the timing difference between two different reject events is too large. However, this threat can be easily dealt with on the implementation level (for instance by using a flag). As the trapdoor function f pq is deterministic, the REACT version of our scheme can be tightly reduced to factoring, too.
Comparison
In this section, we give a brief comparison of EPOC-2/3 and our proposed hybrid encryption scheme. Table 1 summarizes the most important parameters regarding security and performance. The efficiency of encryption and decryption is measured in modular multiplications, where M M (k) denotes a modular multiplication modulo a k-bit number. We do not distinguish between multiplications and squarings, and we assume that a modular exponentiation with a k bit exponent takes approximately 3k/2 modular multiplications, whilst a double exponentiation as necessary for performing the Okamoto-Uchiyama encryption takes approximately 7k/4 modular multiplications using standard techniques. We have not considered exponent recoding techniques, which are applicable in our scheme due to the fixed exponents. Chinese remaindering is taken into account if possible. Hashing, evaluations of the key derivation function and the symmetric key operations are not measured, because these magnitudes are comparable in all schemes. For evaluating the public key sizes, we compare n, g, h on the EPOC-2/3 side with n in our proposed scheme. The secret key sizes are the same (p, g p for EPOC-2/3, resp. p, d for our proposed scheme). All quantities are measured in terms of the security parameter k (i.e. the bit-length of the prime Table 1 . Comparison of important parameters factors p, q). In case of EPOC-2/3, we assume that rLen = k and HashLen ≥ 2k hold (these are the values determining the exponent sizes). As modular multiplication is quadratic in the length of the modulus, we conclude that our scheme is the most efficient one in decryption, whilst in encryption it is slightly less efficient than EPOC-2/3. Furthermore, the public key is 3 times shorter in our proposed scheme, and the underlying security assumption is optimal (as it is the case for EPOC-2). Another advantage of our scheme is the following: If one-time pad is used for the symmetric part, then the message length in our scheme is 2k compared to k in EPOC-2/3. This is because the bandwidth of f pq is twice as large as the bandwidth of the Okamoto-Uchiyama trapdoor function.
B Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. We prove Theorem 4 using a series of games. Let A T be an attacker against the CCA-security of the proposed Tag-KEM and let y * be defined as
pq . Furthermore, let KLen denote the length of valid DEM keys. In each game "Game i", let S i be the event that the attacker correctly guesses the hidden bit b. Without loss of generality, we assume that the adversary does not ask the same query more than once to the decapsulation oracle.
Game 0: This is the original attack game as defined in Definition 4. Thus we have
Game 1: This game is the same as above, with the exception that the random oracles are simulated as follows 6 : KDF: An initially empty list KList is prepared. Given a query x, the following steps are performed: If (x, K) is in KList, then return K. Otherwise randomly generate K , a bit-string of length KLen, add (x, K ) to KList, and return K . H: An initially empty list HList is prepared. Given a query (x, τ ), the following steps are performed: If ((x, τ ), hash) is in HList, then return hash. Otherwise randomly generate hash , a bit-string of length HashLen, add ((x, τ ), hash ) to HList, and return hash . From the ideal assumptions to the random oracles in Game 0 we deduce that Game 0 and Game 1 are perfectly indistinguishable. Hence, we conclude 
Game 2: This game is the same as above, with the only difference that the challenge Ψ * := (y * , c * 2 ) is fixed at the beginning of the game, where c * 2 is a randomly generated bit-string of length HashLen. It is easy to see that Game 1 and Game 2 are indistinguishable from the adversary's point of view if none of the following events takes place:
-The adversary ever queries the oracle H on ω * . We call this event Ask2. -The adversary ever queries the KDF oracle on x with KDF(x) = dk b , where dk b is the challenge key given to the adversary in Step 4. The probability of this event is upperbounded by q K /KLen. -The decapsulation oracle is queried on (Ψ * , τ ), where τ is the tag on which the adversary wishes to be challenged. From the restrictions on the adversary, this is only allowed before Step 6. However, in this case Ψ * is hidden to the adversary and thus the probability of this event is upperbounded by q D /(n + HashLen).
-The decapsulation oracle is queried on (Ψ * , τ ), where τ = τ and H(ω * , τ ) = c 2 holds (i.e. (Ψ * , τ ) is a valid encapsulation). The probability of this event and ¬Ask2 is upperbounded by q D /HashLen. note the events r < pq and Ask3 are independent, because the distributions of {x n mod n|n ∈ Z × n } and {x n mod n|n ∈ Z × pq } are identical.). Thus we conclude
Finally, from the equations (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9) the assertion follows.
Remark 4. The gcd-trick exploited in the proof above is due to Fujisaki [Fuj01] . The benefit here is that f pq evaluations are replaced by cheaper gcd-computations.
